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RIDDING FOIA OF THOSE “UNANTICIPATED
CONSEQUENCES”:1 REPAVING A NECESSARY
ROAD TO FREEDOM
CHARLES J. WICHMANN III
A government by secrecy benefits no one. It injures the people it
seeks to serve; it damages its own integrity and operation. It breeds
distrust, dampens the fervor of its citizens and mocks their loyalty.2
The question, of course, is whether this public expense is worth
it . . . .3
INTRODUCTION
On June 10, 1997, Elmer “Geronimo” Pratt, a former leader of
the Black Panther Party who had been convicted in 1972 of a 1968
murder-robbery, was freed on bail after a California state judge or-
dered a new trial.4 The new trial order represented the culmination of
more than two decades of appeals and denied writs.5 Pratt, who has
always maintained his innocence, asserted that he was framed by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as part of an attempt to de-
stroy the Black Panthers.6 The judge granted Pratt a new trial be-
1. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar.-
Apr. 1982, at 15, 15 (criticizing the Act as “the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated
Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored”).
2. 110 CONG. REC. 17,087 (1964) (statement of Sen. Long).
3. Scalia, supra note 1, at 17.
4. See William Booth, Ex-Black Panther Freed; After 25 Years, “The Struggle Continues,”
WASH. POST, June 11, 1997, at A1.
5. See Edward J. Boyer, Lawyer Presses 23-Year Battle on Behalf of “Geronimo” Pratt,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1997, at B1 [hereinafter Boyer, Lawyer Presses 23-Year Battle].
6. See Edward J. Boyer, Pratt Strides into Freedom, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1997, at A1
[hereinafter Boyer, Pratt Strides into Freedom] (“Pratt said he understood that former FBI Di-
rector J. Edgar Hoover and former President Richard Nixon ‘launched a program to kill us all.
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cause his conviction was “tainted by the prosecutor’s failure to reveal
that a crucial witness was also a police and FBI informer.”7 Critical to
Pratt’s receiving a new trial were several requests made under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).8 Pratt’s FOIA requests re-
vealed that Julius Butler, a key prosecution witness who had testified
that Pratt had confessed to committing the murder, had provided po-
lice and FBI agents with information on the Black Panthers for al-
most two and a half years preceding the Pratt trial.9 Since Butler had
denied under oath that he had ever been a police or FBI informant,
this information would have enabled Pratt’s defense attorneys to im-
peach his credibility.10 The effect that this information could have had
on Pratt’s 1972 trial is demonstrated by the fact that several jurors in
that original trial have since stated that they would not have voted to
convict Pratt if they had known that Butler was an informant.11
Pratt’s FOIA requests also turned up FBI documents that
showed that FBI director J. Edgar Hoover had ordered that Pratt and
other prominent Panther members be “neutralized.”12 Pratt also dis-
covered documents that supported his contention that he was in
Oakland on the night of the murder.13 The impact of the documents
Pratt and his attorneys procured through FOIA is clear; without
FOIA, Pratt would still be in jail.14
[The Black Panther Party was] at the center of the bull’s-eye.’”); see also Clarence Page, Com-
mentary, Time for a New Peek at Old FBI Files, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1997, at 21 (“Pratt always
had maintained that the FBI knew he was innocent because it allegedly had him under surveil-
lance in Oakland when the murder occurred in Santa Monica.”). M. Wesley Swearingen, a 25-
year FBI veteran, supports Pratt’s view, contending that wiretap logs placed Pratt in Oakland
at the time of the murder but that “someone had destroyed these logs.” M. WESLEY
SWEARINGEN, FBI SECRETS: AN AGENT’S EXPOSÉ 86 (1995).
7. Booth, supra note 4, at A1.
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
9. See Boyer, Lawyer Presses 23-Year Battle, supra note 5, at B1.
10. See id.
11. See Booth, supra note 4, at A1. The judge who reversed Pratt’s conviction noted that
the information about Butler would have enabled Pratt’s lawyers to “put the whole case in a
different light.” Edward J. Boyer, D.A. Appeals Decision to Release Ex-Black Panther, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998, at B1 [hereinafter Boyer, D.A. Appeals].
12. See Tony Jones, Cochran: Past, Present Future, TRI-STATE DEFENDER, May 10, 1995,
at 1A. A retired FBI agent has corroborated these documents, stating that Pratt was “framed as
part of the FBI’s now-defunct counter intelligence program—covert efforts to ‘neutralize’ what
they called ‘black hate groups.’” Boyer, Pratt Strides into Freedom, supra note 6, at A1.
13. See Booth, supra note 4, at A1.
14. On January 30, 1998, Los Angeles County District Attorney Gil Garcetti appealed
Pratt’s release, arguing that “nothing points to Pratt’s innocence; everything points to his guilt.”
Boyer, D.A. Appeals, supra note 11, at B1. The Los Angeles Times characterized Garcetti’s
decision to appeal as “unwise” and “a fool’s errand.” Editorial, Misguided Move Against Pratt,
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If Geronimo Pratt’s story were the norm, FOIA’s usefulness
would be beyond debate. For every one case like Geronimo Pratt’s,
however, there are many cases like that of Frank Jimenez. Jimenez, a
prisoner at the Oxford Federal Correctional Institution in Wisconsin,
has submitted numerous FOIA requests which appear to have done
nothing but waste the government’s time and resources. Jimenez
sought all records held by eight separate executive agencies that were
“in any way connected to, related to or even remotely in reference to
his name.”15 For example, Jimenez requested the U.S. Postal Service
(USPS) to provide “all records concerning himself regarding mail he
received in the states of Wisconsin and Illinois.”16 Government agen-
cies must undertake a serious search in response to each FOIA re-
quest, and the burden is on the agencies to establish that materials
have not been improperly withheld.17 The USPS, therefore, per-
formed an “exhaustive but unfruitful” search of its records.18 Simi-
larly, Jimenez’s request to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Fire-
arms (ATF) turned up no responsive records—a result which was
hardly surprising since the ATF had not been involved in the investi-
gation or prosecution of Jimenez.19 The FBI, however, had more dif-
ficulty responding to Jimenez’s FOIA request. Citing extremely lim-
ited resources and a backlog of 3,080 requests ahead of Jimenez’s, the
FBI moved to stay the proceedings to give it until March 2000 to
process the request.20 Unconvinced that Jimenez’s request was neces-
sary or urgent, the district court agreed with the FBI that the
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1998, at B6. If the appeal fails, most legal observers believe that the prose-
cution will be unable to win a new trial since Butler has been discredited and the only eye-
witness is now dead. See Boyer, Pratt Strides into Freedom, supra note 6, at A1.
15. Jimenez v. FBI, 938 F. Supp. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 1996). Jimenez made FOIA requests to
the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the U.S. Postal Service, the Bureau of Prisons, the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorney, the U.S.
Marshals Service, and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. See id. at 24-25.
16. Id. at 26.
17. See United States Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 n.3 (1989) (citing
FOIA’s legislative history to support the Court’s holding that the burden is on the government
agency); see also Safecard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding
that a search is adequate if it is “reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents”);
Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[A] search need not be perfect, only
adequate, and adequacy is measured by the reasonableness of the effort in light of the specific
request.”); Weisberg v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(“What the agency must show beyond material doubt is that it has conducted a search reasona-
bly calculated to uncover all relevant documents.”).
18. Jimenez, 938 F. Supp. at 26.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 31.
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Agency’s delay was justifiable and thereby granted the motion to stay
the proceedings until March 2000.21
The use of FOIA by prisoners such as Frank Jimenez and
Geronimo Pratt highlights the benefits and problems of the statute.
One of FOIA’s purposes is to enable people to expose government
action to “the light of public scrutiny.”22 In Pratt’s case, the govern-
ment had paid an informant and then improperly withheld this in-
formation which, had it been disclosed at trial, may well have led to
an acquittal. Twenty-five years later, Pratt was able to use FOIA to
expose that improper government action and to use the previously
withheld information to regain his freedom. In contrast, Jimenez’s
experience shows how FOIA can be abused at enormous cost to
American taxpayers and illustrates the delays that can occur as un-
derstaffed federal agencies struggle to respond to requests for infor-
mation that the agencies may or may not possess.23
This Note surveys recent FOIA cases which illustrate the delays
that have come to plague FOIA administration. In 1996, in an effort
to cure these delays and update FOIA for the computer age, Con-
gress passed the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amend-
ments of 1996 (E-FOIA).24 This Note analyzes the major provisions
21. See id. at 31-32. FOIA permits courts to grant time extensions under certain condi-
tions: “If the Government can show exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is ex-
ercising due diligence in responding to the request, the court may retain jurisdiction and allow
the agency additional time to complete its review of the records.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)
(1994).
22. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
23. Legislative and scholarly commentators have focused their criticism on these costs and
delays, and the abuses of FOIA have engendered debate over the wisdom and merits of having
such a freely available window into the operation of federal agencies. Compare The Electronic
Freedom of Information Improvement Act: Hearings on S. 1940 Before the Subcomm. on Tech.
and the Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1992) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (“FOIA proves that the best way to combat the coverups, the mistakes, and the secret
policies that undermine faith in our democratic system is to expose them to public view.”), and
Jane Kirtley, Freedom of Information Act—How Is It Working?, COMM. LAW., Fall 1996, at 7,
9 [hereinafter Kirtley, FOIA] (arguing that oversight by the press and the public “provides the
only independent assurance that the rights of the individual are being preserved”), and Chris-
topher P. Beall, Note, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines over Public Information Law, 45
DUKE L.J. 1249, 1299 (1996) (“Access to information . . . ensures for the individual citizen a
sense of empowerment and control over a government that can at times appear monolithic and
imperious.”), with Scalia, supra note 1, at 19 (“The defects of the Freedom of Information Act
cannot be cured as long as we are dominated by the obsession that gave them birth—that the
first line of defense against an arbitrary executive is do-it-yourself oversight by the public and
its surrogate, the press.”).
24. Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 [hereinafter E-FOIA] (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(Supp. II 1996)).
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of E-FOIA and concludes that congressional attempts to use admin-
istrative changes to reduce delays in FOIA administration are des-
tined to fail as long as agency FOIA-processing units remain under-
staffed and underfunded. Part I begins by briefly sketching the be-
ginnings and intended purposes of FOIA. It then examines the early
amendments to the statute and discusses how these amendments led
to many unanticipated consequences, including enormous increases
in the administrative cost of FOIA and in the time delays in process-
ing requests. Part I concludes by discussing the 1986 FOIA amend-
ments which included changes to FOIA’s fee provisions. Part II
evaluates judicial attempts to balance FOIA’s requirement of open
government with present fiscal constraints and agency staffing prob-
lems. Part III outlines the major provisions of E-FOIA and explores
how it may affect a typical FOIA case and whether it will help reduce
the administrative and financial burdens of FOIA. Part IV surveys
alternative measures that have been suggested by scholars and legis-
lators for reducing FOIA’s cost and agency backlogs. It concludes
that none of these measures would effectively address FOIA’s prob-
lems while preserving the benefits of a policy of open government.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOIA, 1966-1996
A. The Birth of FOIA: Introducing an Era of Open Government
The Freedom of Information Act was born out of concerns
about a growing federal bureaucracy that was not accountable to the
electorate25 and about the “mushrooming growth of Government se-
crecy.”26 Early champions of a freedom of information bill recognized
the importance of an informed populace in a democracy, believing
that “[f]ree people are, of necessity, informed; uninformed people
can never be free.”27 They saw FOIA as an essential way to ensure
25. See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Per-
ils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 650 (1984) (noting that
Congress enacted FOIA at a time when, even before Watergate, the public was suspicious of
government bureaucracy).
26. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2419.
27. Freedom of Information: Hearings on S. 1666 and S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 3 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Edward Long); see also HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO
KNOW: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS xiii (1953) (“Public business
is the public’s business. The people have the right to know. Freedom of information is their just
heritage. Without that the citizens of a democracy have but changed their kings.”); H.R. REP.
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that the government would be open. In the vanguard of the freedom
of information movement was the press, a group that had historically
encountered administrative roadblocks in its quest to inform the
public about questionable governmental practices.28 Despite the
press’s traditional role as the public’s watchdog, legal complications
were depriving the press of its “most vital raw material”—public rec-
ords and proceedings.29 Frustrated by the lack of an enforceable legal
right to examine public records, reporters had to rely upon “the fa-
vorable exercise of official grace or indulgence or ‘discretion.’”30
The Freedom of Information Act of 196631 fundamentally
changed the way that requests for information were handled by cre-
ating a presumption in favor of disclosure and by requiring agencies
to justify any nondisclosure.32 Prior to FOIA, the release of govern-
mental records was governed largely by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA),33 which required only that public records be made
available to “persons properly and directly concerned,” and ex-
empted the nebulous category “information held confidential for
NO. 93-876, at 2 (1974) (“An informed public makes the difference between mob rule and
democratic government. If the pertinent and necessary information on government activities is
denied the public, the result is a weakening of the democratic process and the ultimate atrophy
of our form of government.”) (quoting Letter of William L. Dawson)), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.C.A.N 6267, 6268; Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822) (“A
popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Pro-
logue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And
a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.”), reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
28. See Wald, supra note 25, at 650 & n.4 (discussing the press’s frequent encounters with
“government agencies’ random, unexplained denials of access to information about crucial de-
cisions, denials which had covered up the mistakes or irregularities of the time”).
29. CROSS, supra note 27, at 4.
30. Id. at 197.
31. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 [hereinafter FOIA] (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
552 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
32. See id. at 251 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)) (“[E]very
agency shall, upon request for identifiable records . . . make such records promptly available to
any person.” (emphasis added)). Upon complaint of nondisclosure made to a district court,
“the court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden shall be upon the agency to sus-
tain its action.” Id. From an administrative law perspective, FOIA is unique because of its de
novo review of many agency determinations, including the determination that a particular
document is exempted under the statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
Outside of FOIA, a reviewing court can normally set aside agency findings and conclusions
only if they are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
33. Pub. L. No. 79-404, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) [hereinafter APA]. The original APA
no longer exists in recognizable form. After being modified by FOIA, it was replaced when
Congress enacted Title 5 of the United States Code. See Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
554, 80 Stat. 378.
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good cause found.”34 The introduction to FOIA explicitly stated that
its purpose was “to clarify and protect the right of the public to in-
formation.”35 It required that records be made available to “any per-
son,”36 and an agency seeking to withhold a record after 1966 had to
show that the information contained in the record fell within one of
nine limited statutory exemptions.37
B. The 1974 Amendments: The Source of Unanticipated Consequences
Despite the powerful rhetoric employed by proponents of a
freedom of information statute, FOIA as originally enacted was rela-
tively ineffective.38 Administrative agencies routinely “delayed re-
34. APA, supra note 33, § 3(c), 60 Stat. at 238.
35. FOIA, supra note 31, 80 Stat. at 250.
36. Id. at 251.
37. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1)-(9) (1994). The exemptions covered documents:
(1) Classified as secret for national defense or foreign policy reasons;
(2) Related solely to internal agency personnel rules and practices;
(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute;
(4) Containing trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information;
(5) Containing legally privileged information;
(6) Containing personnel, medical or “similar” files that, if disclosed, would result in an
invasion of privacy;
(7) Involving law enforcement investigations, but only to the extent that disclosure
(A) Would interfere with law enforcement proceedings;
(B) Would deprive a person of a fair trial;
(C) Could result in an invasion of privacy;
(D) Could disclose the identity of a confidential source;
(E) Would disclose law enforcement techniques; or
(F) Could endanger the life or safety of any person;
(8) Involving financial regulatory activities; or
(9) Involving geological information about oil or natural gas wells.
See id.
Six of the nine exemptions have survived to this day with little or no change to their
original language. The exemptions that have undergone significant changes are Exemption 1,
which was amended in 1974 to limit the exemption to classified documents, see Act of Nov. 21,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563 [hereinafter 1974 Amendments] (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1994)); Exemption 3, which was amended in 1976 to add a set of crite-
ria intended to limit the situations where the exemption could be invoked, see Government in
the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1241, 1247 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(3) (1994)); and Exemption 7, which was expanded in 1986 to further limit public access
to certain investigatory files, see Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
570, § 1802(a), 100 Stat. 3207-48, 3207-48 to 3207-49 [hereinafter 1986 Reform Act] (codified at
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1994)).
38. See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7 (1981) (“Initial administrative compliance with the Freedom of In-
formation Act was not particularly impressive.”); Scalia, supra note 1, at 15 (“The 1966 version
WICHMANNFINAL.DOC 11/03/98  10:38 AM
1220 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:1213
sponses to requests for documents, replied with arbitrary denials, and
overclassified documents to take advantage of the ‘national security’
exemption.”39 FOIA began to develop into its present form in 1974,
when Congress amended it in an effort to remedy the perceived defi-
ciencies in the statute’s administration.40 The amendments signifi-
cantly reduced agencies’ discretion over whether to release informa-
tion41 and eliminated inefficiencies in the processing of requests “in
order to contribute to the fuller and faster release of information,
which is the basic objective of the Act.”42 Unfortunately, Congress
did not anticipate a major effect of its alterations: after the 1974
amendments, the number of FOIA requests skyrocketed.43 Prior to
the changes, Congress had estimated that the new amendments
would cost the government about $50,000 for the first year, and
$100,000 for each of the following five years.44 The actual costs of
FOIA quickly and dramatically surpassed these conservative esti-
mates.45 By 1991, FOIA’s annual expense totaled $91 million,46 and in
1992, the figure had increased to $108 million.47
[of FOIA] was a relatively toothless beast . . . .”).
39. Scalia, supra note 1, at 15; see also H.R. REP. NO. 92-1419, at 8-9 (1972) (“The effi-
cient operation of the Freedom of Information Act has been hindered by five years of foot-
dragging by the Federal bureaucracy.”).
40. See 1974 Amendments, supra note 37, 88 Stat. at 1561.
41. See O’BRIEN, supra note 38, at 8.
42. H.R. REP. NO. 93-876, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6267.
43. For example, the FBI received 447 FOIA requests in 1974, and 13,875 requests in
1975. See Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 617 n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
44. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-876, at 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6275. Congress
believed that agencies’ operating budgets would be able to absorb most of the costs, including
the cost of searching for the requested information. See id.; see also Eric J. Sinrod, Freedom of
Information Act Response Deadlines: Bridging the Gap Between Legislative Intent and Eco-
nomic Reality, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 325, 334 (1994) (noting that, based on the belief that admini-
stration of FOIA would not entail significant costs, Congress did not appropriate additional
resources to fund the 1974 amendments).
45. In fact, the cost of implementing FOIA in fiscal year 1974 for the FBI alone was
$160,000. See Open America, 547 F.2d at 612. By fiscal year 1976, the actual costs for the FBI
totaled $2,675,000. See id. The FBI was not alone. A single request by a former CIA agent cost
the CIA an estimated $400,000. See Agee v. CIA, 517 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 n.5 (D.D.C. 1981).
These sums had been amassed at individual agencies despite projections that the cost of FOIA
to the entire government for the period 1976-80 would amount to no more than $500,000. See
supra text accompanying note 44.
46. See Sinrod, supra note 44, at 334.
47. See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 21 (1996).
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These dramatic increases came about because of a change in
FOIA’s fee provisions.48 Prior to 1974, an agency could charge re-
questers for the costs of searching for responsive documents, re-
viewing documents for exempted information that the agency could
then delete, and duplicating the documents that were to be released.49
The 1974 amendments limited fees to “reasonable standard charges
for document search and duplication and provide[d] for recovery of
only the direct costs of such search and duplication.”50 The change
forced agencies to bear the cost of reviewing documents for ex-
empted material. This review process is the most expensive part of
processing FOIA requests because it often requires the use of highly
trained agency personnel.51 For example, documents requested by
prisoners are typically investigative files that may contain references
to a confidential source,52 or material that, if released, could reasona-
bly result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.53 In proc-
essing such a request, someone familiar with the investigation must
go through the documents “line by line to delete those portions, and
only those portions, that would disclose a confidential source or come
within one of the other specific exceptions to the requirement of dis-
closure.”54
C. The 1986 Amendments: Amending FOIA’s Fee Structure Again
In an attempt to address FOIA’s rapidly escalating costs, Con-
gress passed the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 (1986
Reform Act),55 which significantly increased agencies’ ability to
charge requesters for the costs of processing requests.56 Senator Orrin
48. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 16.
49. See id.
50. 1974 Amendments, supra note 37, § 1(b)(2), 88 Stat. at 1561 (amended 1986)
(emphasis added).
51. See Orrin G. Hatch, Balancing Freedom of Information with Confidentiality for Law
Enforcement, 9 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 8 (1983); Scalia, supra note 1, at 16.
52. Such material would be exempt under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D).
53. Such material would be exempt under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
54. Scalia, supra note 1, at 16.
55. 1986 Reform Act, supra note 37, § 1803, 100 Stat. at 3207-48 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§552(a)(4)(A) (1994)). The 1986 FOIA amendments were attached to the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act as part of a last-minute addition. See Susan L. Beesley & Theresa A. Newman Glover,
Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act—1986, 1987 DUKE L.J. 521, 524
(1987). Congress had been considering a more substantial overhaul of FOIA, but additional
measures died in the Senate after passing the House. See id. at 523-24.
56. See generally Beesley & Newman Glover, supra note 55, at 529-34 (discussing the ex-
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Hatch, one of the Act’s sponsors, estimated that if agencies could
charge commercial requesters for the cost of document review, the
agencies would be able to collect up to $60 million per year in addi-
tional fees.57 The amendments established a three-tiered fee system,
dividing requests into (1) requests for commercial use; (2) non-
commercial requests by the news media or by educational or scien-
tific institutions whose purpose is scholarly or scientific; and (3) all
other non-commercial requests.58 For category (1) requests, agencies
may assess charges for document search, duplication, and review.59
For category (2) requests, agencies may only assess document dupli-
cation charges.60 For category (3) requests, agencies may assess search
and document duplication charges but not charges for review.61 In
addition, category (2) and (3) requesters may not be charged for the
first two hours of search time or the first 100 pages of duplication.62
Regardless of which category the request falls into, no fee may be
charged if the costs of collecting or processing the fee would likely
exceed the amount of the fee.63 Finally, if a requester has previously
failed to pay fees in a timely manner or if the agency determines that
the fee will exceed $250, the agency may require advance payment of
the expected fee.64
The 1986 Reform Act also clarified the circumstances under
which a fee waiver is appropriate. The 1974 FOIA amendments re-
quired documents to be furnished at a reduced rate or at no charge
when the agency determined that doing so was “in the public interest
because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily
benefiting the general public.”65 In interpreting this section, courts
had given agencies broad discretion to determine whether to grant a
pected changes in FOIA fees created by the 1986 Reform Act).
57. See 132 CONG. REC. 26,771 (1986).
58. See 1986 Reform Act, supra note 37, § 1803, 100 Stat. at 3207-49 to 3207-50 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I)-(III) (1994)).
59. See id. (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I) (1994)).
60. See id. (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II) (1994)).
61. See id. (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III) (1994)).
62. See id. (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(II) (1994)).
63. See id. (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(I) (1994)).
64. See id. (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(v) (1994)).
65. 1974 Amendments, supra note 37, § 1(b)(2), 88 Stat. at 1561. It is perhaps interesting
to note that indigence does not entitle a requester to a fee waiver. See Crooker v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 577 F. Supp. 1213, 1216 (D.D.C. 1983) (permitting agency to
deny fee waiver despite claim of indigence where there is no showing that the public would
benefit from disclosure).
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fee waiver.66 The 1986 Reform Act narrowed the definition of “public
interest,” so that an agency must grant a fee waiver only when disclo-
sure of information “is likely to contribute significantly to public un-
derstanding of the operations or activities of the government and is
not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.”67 The Act
also changed the standard of review so that courts would review an
agency’s fee waiver determination de novo.68
The fee provisions that the 1986 Reform Act established draw
the proper balance between keeping government activities open to
the light of public scrutiny and fiscal realities. Requesters whose pri-
mary interest in certain government information is commercial
should pay the government the entire price of collecting, reviewing,
and disclosing that information. Similarly, requesters whose primary
purpose is to inform the public about governmental activities should
be able to procure such information with minimal costs. Unfortu-
nately, despite these fee provisions, backlogs and delays continue to
exist.69
II. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO BALANCE STATUTORY COMMANDS
WITH FISCAL REALITIES
The inadequacy of congressional attempts to ameliorate the
problems surrounding FOIA’s administration, coupled with agencies’
inability to handle the huge influx of requests due to woeful under-
funding and understaffing, left the judiciary to sort out the mess.
Since the passage of the 1974 amendments, courts have granted be-
sieged agencies tremendous time extensions and, relying on early
legislative history, have interpreted FOIA to allow agencies to with-
hold more information than they previously could.
66. See, e.g., Shaw v. FBI, 604 F. Supp. 342, 346 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that an agency
determination not to waive search fees should be disturbed only if that determination is arbi-
trary or amounts to an abuse of discretion).
67. 1986 Reform Act, supra note 37, § 1803, 100 Stat. at 3207-50 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (1994)).
68. See id. (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii) (1994)).
69. See infra text accompanying note 109 (giving recent estimates of the backlog and delay
at the FBI).
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A. Time Extensions: Defining “Exceptional Circumstances” and “Due
Diligence”
The first case in which a court intervened to permit understaffed
federal agencies to take more time to process FOIA requests was
Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force.70 In Open
America, a public interest group, a law professor, and several law
students sought documents relating to a former Acting Director of
the FBI’s role in the Watergate scandal.71 After the FBI received the
request, it notified the plaintiffs that there were 5,137 FOIA requests
in front of theirs.72 The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to
require detailed justification, itemization, and indexing of documents
within thirty days.73 The government appealed, arguing that the FBI
had exercised “due diligence” in processing the FOIA requests, but
that “exceptional circumstances” existed that prevented it from proc-
essing them within the statutory time limits.74 In such circumstances,
the 1974 FOIA amendments state, “the court may retain jurisdiction
and allow the agency additional time to complete its review of the re-
cords.”75
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, citing the lan-
guage and legislative history of the 1974 FOIA amendments, vacated
the district court’s order.76 According to FOIA at that time, an agency
that received a request for information had to determine whether it
would grant or deny that request within ten days.77 In “unusual cir-
cumstances,” however, the agency was permitted an additional ten
working days.78 After that period, the requester was deemed to have
70. 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
71. See id. at 608.
72. See id. Of these, 1,084 were in “various stages of completion.” Id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 610.
75. 1974 Amendments, supra note 37, § 1, 88 Stat. at 1563 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
76. See Open America, 547 F.2d at 610-13, 616.
77. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1994). FOIA’s time limits were doubled in 1996. See E-
FOIA, supra note 24, 110 Stat. at 3052 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (Supp. II 1996)).
These changes are discussed infra Part III.A.5.
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B) (1994). “Unusual circumstances” included:
(i) the need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities or
other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request;
(ii) the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous amount
of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request; or
(iii) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable speed,
WICHMANNFINAL.DOC 11/03/98  10:38 AM
1998] REPAVING THE FOIA ROAD TO FREEDOM 1225
exhausted his administrative remedies79 and could bring an action in
district court to compel production of the documents.80 The agency
could obtain a stay in the proceedings, however, and thus gain addi-
tional time to review the records, if it could “show [that] exceptional
circumstances exist[ed] and that the agency [was] exercising due dili-
gence in responding to the request.”81
In Open America, the D.C. Circuit examined the legislative his-
tory of the 1974 FOIA amendments and determined that Congress
inserted the “exceptional circumstances” language of section
552(a)(6)(C) “as a safety valve after the protests of the [Ford] ad-
ministration that the rigid limits of [sections 552(a)(6)] (A) and (B)
might prove unworkable.”82 The court stated that “exceptional cir-
cumstances” exist when an agency “is deluged with a volume of re-
quests for information vastly in excess of that anticipated by Con-
gress, [and] the existing resources are inadequate to deal with the
volume of such requests within the time limits of subsection
(6)(A).”83 Applied to the facts, the court found that the FBI’s expen-
diture of $2,675,000 in processing FOIA requests in 1976, a year in
which Congress had anticipated that FOIA would cost the entire gov-
ernment only $100,000, constituted “exceptional circumstances.”84 It
further found that the agency’s use of a two-track system to handle
simple and complex requests on separate “first-in, first-out” bases
satisfied the “due diligence” requirement.85 Since the plaintiffs al-
with another agency having a substantial interest in the determination of the request
or among two or more components of the agency having substantial subject-matter
interest therein.
Id. §§ 552(a)(6)(B)(i)-(iii).
79. See id. § 552(a)(6)(C).
80. See id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
81. Id. § 552(a)(6)(C).
82. Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 610 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
83. Id. at 616.
84. See id. at 612.
85. See id. at 616. But see Mayock v. INS, 714 F. Supp. 1558, 1566 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(holding that a first-in, first-out processing policy did not constitute “due diligence” because the
INS did not accord priority to requests for information needed for immigration proceedings),
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Mayock v. Nelson, 938 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1991). Mayock v. INS
was initially decided on summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for the
resolution of outstanding issues of fact. See Nelson, 938 F.2d at 1008. After the case was re-
manded, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that resulted in changes to FOIA
processing practices at the INS. See infra note 117 (discussing elements of the settlement
agreement).
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leged no urgency or exceptional need for the information they had
requested, the court reasoned that a stay was appropriate.86
More than twenty years later, courts are still struggling with the
same problems. In Edmond v. United States Attorney,87 a prisoner
sued the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) to force the
agency to disclose information responsive to a FOIA request that he
had made on August 14, 1992.88 The prisoner, Rayful Edmond, Jr.,
sent a request to the USAO seeking all documents in the possession
of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the FBI, the
United States Attorney, and the United States Bureau of Prisons
(USBP) which “pertain[ed] to him, mention[ed] his name, or re-
fer[red] to him.”89 Five days later, the USAO notified Edmond that
his request would be handled in the order in which it was received.90
When Edmond had received no documents by December 1994, he
wrote a letter to the USAO asking about the status of his request.91
The USAO’s response explained that his request would be handled
in its turn but noted that the agency was unable to give a specific date
for completion of its processing of the request.92 Edmond and the
USAO exchanged similar letters in 1995 and 1996.93 Having received
no documents and still in prison, Edmond finally resorted to filing
suit in district court on October 15, 1996.94
86. See Open America, 547 F.2d at 614-16. The court recognized that, given the FBI’s fi-
nite resources, priority processing of the plaintiffs’ request would have necessitated taking per-
sonnel away from other prior requests. See id. at 614. The court was unwilling to order such a
reallocation of resources when the plaintiffs “have alleged no urgency, have alleged no excep-
tional need, for the information they seek.” Id.
87. 959 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997).
88. See id. at 2.
89. Id. Edmond is serving an 18-year sentence in federal prison after pleading guilty to
distributing a kilogram of crack cocaine. See Like Son, Like Father; Edmond Gets 18 Years,
WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1991, at C5. Edmond is the father of Rayful Edmond III, who is cur-
rently serving three life terms after being convicted in 1989 of running the District of Colum-
bia’s largest crack distribution ring. See id.
90. See Edmond, 959 F. Supp. at 2.
91. See id.
92. See id. The USAO refused to give a specific date was given despite explicit statutory
instructions that required it to do so:
The time limits . . . may be extended by written notice to the person making such re-
quest setting forth the reasons for such extension and the date on which a determina-
tion is expected to be dispatched. No such notice shall specify a date that would re-
sult in an extension for more than ten working days.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B) (1994).
93. See Edmond, 959 F. Supp. at 2.
94. See id.
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The USAO, estimating that the records responsive to Edmond’s
request consisted of 2,000 pages, and noting that there were thirty-
one requests in front of Edmond’s, asked the district court for an ad-
ditional two years to process his request.95 The district court held that,
based on the record before it, the USAO had satisfied the
“exceptional circumstances” test as defined in Open America.96 It fur-
ther held that the USAO’s use of a “first-in, first-out” system satis-
fied the due diligence requirement.97
The court noted that a stay would not be appropriate if Edmond
could make a showing of “exceptional need or urgency,” which the
court defined as “potential jeopardy to . . . life or personal safety, or
to substantial due process rights.”98 Edmond asserted that the re-
quested documents contained exculpatory material that would aid
him in overturning his criminal conviction.99 The court held, however,
that unless Edmond could “provide an adequate showing” that it was
likely that the requested documents contained “materially exculpa-
tory information,” he was not entitled to priority processing of his
FOIA request. 100 Since Edmond had not made such a showing, he was
not entitled to priority processing.101 The court was not satisfied, how-
ever, that it would take the government two years to process the
thirty-one requests in front of Edmond’s.102 The court therefore
granted the government only one additional year to complete the
processing of Edmond’s request, “with an opportunity to seek a fur-
ther extension if necessary at a later date.”103
Edmond raises several troubling issues concerning the state of
FOIA law. First, Edmond had already been waiting four and a half
years for the information when the district court granted the agency
additional time to respond to the request.104 While it is true that the
95. See id.
96. See id. at 4. Edmond was decided under FOIA as it stood prior to E-FOIA. The new
rules relating to time limits, discussed infra Part III.A.5, went into effect on Oct. 2, 1997. See E-
FOIA, supra note 24, § 12, 110 Stat. at 3054.
97. See Edmond, 959 F. Supp. at 3.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Billington v. United States Dep’t
of Justice, CIV.A. No. 92-0462-RCL (D.D.C. July 21, 1992)). The court emphasized that a
mere “naked assertion” is not enough. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Edmond made his initial FOIA request on August 14, 1992. See id. at 2. The district
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court chose only to grant the agency a one-year extension, instead of
the requested two-year extension, it is troublesome that a prisoner
will be forced to wait over five years to obtain any exculpatory mate-
rial that the government might possess. Second, the court’s require-
ment that Edmond make a showing that the requested material likely
contains exculpatory material in order to obtain priority review is
nearly impossible to satisfy. It is absurd to think that a person in Ed-
mond’s position would be able to know what possible exculpatory
material might be contained in documents that the government has
made an effort to keep secret. Nonetheless, the court in Edmond rea-
soned that allowing prisoners to obtain priority processing without
some additional showing would require courts to grant a large num-
ber of such requests filed by federal prisoners,105 thus negating the
“exceptional” nature of the circumstances.106
Edmond is not unique; other cases have involved even longer
delays. In Fox v. United States Department of Justice,107 for example,
the plaintiff had requested that the FBI furnish him with all docu-
ments in its possession relating to him.108 The FBI had located over
300 pages of documents pertaining to Fox but, citing a backlog of
11,828 requests and Congress’s failure to delegate money to expand
the FBI’s small staff of FOIA processors, said that it did not expect to
be able to process those documents until 1999.109 The court granted
the government’s motion to stay the case, requiring only that the FBI
court’s order was issued on February 27, 1997. See id. at 1.
105. See id. at 4. The court noted that “a mere challenge to a conviction which might subse-
quently release prisoner [sic] from incarcerative status does not warrant an expedited process.”
Id.
106. See id. Courts have required that a plaintiff establish an “exceptional need or urgency”
to get prioritization over earlier requests. Id. at 3. This judicial practice was codified by E-
FOIA with the establishment of a system of expedited review. See infra Part III.A.4.
107. No. CV-94-4622, 1994 WL 923072, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1994).
108. See id. Fox asserted that the FBI began investigating him following his participation in
a peaceful protest against the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1947. See id. As
part of this investigation, FBI agents spoke to his parents. See id. Fox maintained that after his
parents learned of his involvement in the protest, his relationship with them deteriorated. See
id. Fox asserts that he was excluded from the trust left by his parents due to this soured rela-
tionship. See id. Prior to bringing his FOIA suit, Fox had brought a separate action challenging
the validity of the trust and accusing the trustee of misappropriation of $2 million. See id. That
court granted summary judgment in favor of the trustee. See id. According to Fox, he would not
have lost that suit if he had been able to introduce the FBI documents into evidence, and he
planned to pursue the action further. See id.
109. See id. at *1-*2.
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file a status report within a year informing the court of any progress it
makes in the processing of Fox’s request.110
There are strong policy arguments on both sides of the debate
over expedited processing for prisoner FOIA requests. On the one
hand, prisoners are among the most litigious classes of citizens in the
country,111 and granting their requests priority review without re-
quiring some additional showing that the requests are likely to un-
cover exculpatory information could have a crippling effect on the ef-
ficient functioning of FOIA. On the other hand, uncovering
exculpatory material that was improperly withheld by the govern-
ment is, perhaps, the quintessential example of why FOIA is needed
in a supposedly just society.112
Long delays in processing FOIA requests have been one of the
statute’s most serious problems since its enactment,113 and the delays
have continued in the 1990s.114 While courts have routinely granted
extensions—even though such extensions were intended only for
“exceptional circumstances”115—their action is an understandable re-
sponse to agencies that are faced with inadequate resources for proc-
essing FOIA requests. But unfortunately, these long delays increase
110. See id. at *3. The court concluded that expedited process was not warranted in this
case because Fox had failed to show how the documents “could substantially change the out-
come of the state court litigation.” Id. at *2.
111. See Julie M. Riewe, The Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes in Prisoner Liti-
gation Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 47 DUKE L.J. 117, 117 (1997) (noting
that “[t]he federal courts increasingly have been inundated with prisoner litigation”).
112. See, e.g., supra notes 4-14 and accompanying text (discussing how Geronimo Pratt used
FOIA to obtain information that led to his release from prison).
113. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 23 (1996) (citing agency delay in responding to requests
as “the single most frequent complaint about the operation of the FOIA”), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3466; see also Robert G. Vaughn, Administrative Alternatives and the Fed-
eral Freedom of Information Act, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 188 n.24 (1984) (citing a 1983 GAO
study which found that the average time it took to answer a FOIA request that turned up re-
sponsive documents was 191 days for the FBI and 270 days for the Office of Information and
Privacy).
114. See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 16 (1996) (noting that only 28 of 75 agencies responding to
a Department of Justice survey in February 1994 reported no backlog of requests); Michael M.
Lowe, Note, The Freedom of Information Act in 1993-94, 43 DUKE L.J. 1282, 1285 (1994)
(reporting that the FBI had a backlog of 8,000 FOIA and Privacy Act requests in 1990); Con-
gress Brings Information Act into Electronic Age, MULTI MED. & VIDEODISC MONITOR, Oct. 1,
1996, available in 1996 WL 8303113 (reporting that the average time for the FBI to process a
FOIA request was 923 days).
115. See Edmond v. United States Attorney, 959 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1997) (“Courts have
uniformly granted the government reasonable periods of time in which to review FOIA re-
quests when there is a backlog.”); Sinrod, supra note 44, at 342 (noting the irony that “the con-
dition of ‘exceptional circumstances’ has become the norm”).
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public cynicism towards the government,116 and can occasionally re-
sult in serious harm to the disappointed requester.117
B. The “Central Purpose” Doctrine: Application to the Privacy
Exemptions
By granting agencies additional time to process FOIA requests,
courts have helped agencies cope with extensive FOIA backlogs.
Courts have also helped agencies by giving them a way to quickly
dispose of certain requests. They have accomplished this latter end
through the “central purpose” doctrine, a judicially created tool de-
signed to alleviate the problem inherent in balancing the competing
concerns of disclosure under FOIA and personal privacy interests in
preventing disclosure.118 The cornerstone of the doctrine was laid by
the Supreme Court in 1989, in United States Department of Justice v.
116. See 142 CONG. REC. S10,894 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(“[R]outine failure to comply with the statutory time limits . . . breeds contempt by citizens who
expect government officials to abide by, not routinely break, the law.”).
117. Timely FOIA responses are particularly important to aliens facing deportation pro-
ceedings. See Sinrod, supra note 44, at 350. Since discovery is not permitted in deportation pro-
ceedings, see Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1194 (7th Cir. 1987), aliens often must rely on FOIA
to obtain information from the INS. See Mayock v. INS, 714 F. Supp. 1558, 1560 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (“FOIA is essentially the only procedure which aliens can use to obtain from the INS
information relevant to their cases.”); see also Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1252 (5th
Cir. 1986) (affirming the denial of a subpoena sought against the INS because the plaintiff
“failed to meet her burden of proving that the materials she sought were essential to her case
and otherwise unavailable” (since FOIA was available to obtain the requested information)
(emphasis added)).
An example of the serious consequences that can result from FOIA delays is the case of
Hassan Tehranijam, an Iranian alien who had petitioned for political asylum, fearing persecu-
tion if returned to Iran. See Sinrod, supra note 44, at 351. The immigration judge doubted the
authenticity of Tehranijam’s political asylum claim and ordered him deported. See id. Prior to
the deportation order, Tehranijam’s attorney had made a FOIA request to the INS for docu-
mentation to support the claim of political persecution, but a large backlog of requests at the
INS delayed processing of his request. See id. Without this needed documentation to support
his claim, Tehranijam was deported. See id. Tehranijam’s attorney eventually sued the INS in
order to change its procedures. See Maycock, 714 F. Supp. at 1559-60. That case ended with a
settlement agreement under which the INS instituted some changes in its processing of FOIA
requests. See Sinrod, supra note 44, at 353-54. The Mayock settlement agreement included ar-
rangements for expedited processing of certain time-sensitive requests and a two-track proc-
essing system to separately handle simple and complex requests. See id. at 354-55. These fea-
tures were included in E-FOIA, to the effect that certain FOIA requests may receive expedited
processing, see infra Part III.A.4, and all agencies are authorized to create a multi-track proc-
essing system. See infra Parts III.A.3.
118. See generally Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public’s Right to Know:
The “Central Purpose” of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 67-69 (1994)
(defining and discussing the central purpose doctrine); Beall, supra note 23, at 1253-61 (same).
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Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.119 In that case, a CBS
news correspondent had sought the criminal records of organized
crime figure Charles Medico and three members of his family.120
Medico’s family business had been investigated by the Pennsylvania
Crime Commission for allegedly obtaining several defense contracts
through improper ties with a corrupt congressman.121 The CBS re-
porter asserted that information concerning past crimes by Medico
would potentially be “a matter of special public interest.”122 The issue
was whether Medico’s criminal rap sheet was exempt from disclosure
under FOIA Exemption 7(C),123 which permits an agency to withhold
a document when disclosure “could reasonably be expected to consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”124 To determine
whether the invasion of privacy that would result from disclosure was
warranted, the Supreme Court used a balancing test, weighing Med-
ico’s privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure.125 The
Court refused, however, to give the alleged public interest much
weight in the balance, stating instead that:
[A]lthough there is undoubtedly some public interest in anyone’s
criminal history, especially if the history is in some way related to
the subject’s dealing with a public official or agency, the FOIA’s
central purpose is to ensure that the Government’s activities be
opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information
about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the
Government be so disclosed.126
The Court concluded that the public interest in the information
sought by the reporter simply fell “outside the ambit of the public in-
terest that the FOIA was enacted to serve.”127 In the context of the
privacy-public interest balancing test, this requirement that requested
information open governmental activities “to the sharp eye of public
scrutiny” has subsequently been referred to as the “central purpose”
doctrine.128
119. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
120. See id. at 757.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1994).
124. Id.
125. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762.
126. Id. at 774.
127. Id. at 775.
128. See Cate et al., supra note 118, at 67; Beall, supra note 23, at 1258.
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The Court’s decision in Reporters Committee, which was not
based on any language found in FOIA,129 fundamentally “changed the
FOIA calculus.”130 The central purpose doctrine has been subse-
quently reaffirmed and expanded. In 1991, the Supreme Court, in
United States Department of State v. Ray,131 extended the central pur-
pose doctrine to FOIA Exemption 6,132 the other privacy exemption,
which covers “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclo-
sure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy.”133 The Court reaffirmed and strengthened the central
purpose doctrine in 1994, in United States Department of Defense v.
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA),134 another Exemption 6
case. The Court in FLRA explicitly stated that when balancing the
public interest in disclosure against the potential invasion of privacy,
“the only relevant public interest in disclosure to be weighed in this
balance is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core pur-
pose of the FOIA, which is contributing significantly to public under-
standing of the operations or activities of the government.”135
In 1997, the Court, in a per curiam decision, reversed a Ninth
Circuit panel and reaffirmed its FLRA decision.136 Bibles v. Oregon
Natural Desert Association (ONDA) involved a FOIA request to the
Oregon Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for the names and ad-
dresses of recipients of the BLM’s newsletter.137 The Ninth Circuit
panel found a “substantial public interest in knowing to whom the
government is directing information, or as ONDA characterizes it,
‘propaganda,’ so that those persons may receive information from
other sources that do not share the BLM’s self-interest in presenting
129. See United States Dep’t of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487,
507 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 505 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Glenn Dickinson, Comment, The Su-
preme Court’s Narrow Reading of the Public Interest Served by the Freedom of Information Act,
59 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 211 (arguing that the Reporters Committee decision shifted the balance
away from full disclosure); Beall, supra note 23, at 1261 (criticizing the central purpose juris-
prudence for shifting the burden to the FOIA requester “and against the underlying principle
of disclosure”).
131. 502 U.S. 164 (1991)
132. See id. at 171, 177-79.
133. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1994).
134. 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
135. Id. at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first emphasis added).
136. See Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n (ONDA), 117 S. Ct. 795, 795-96 (1997) (per
curiam).
137. See Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Bibles, 83 F.3d 1168, 1169 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d
per curiam, 117 S. Ct. 795 (1997).
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government activities in the most favorable light.”138 The Supreme
Court viewed the Ninth Circuit decision as resting on “a perceived
public interest in providing persons on the BLM’s mailing list with
additional information,”139 a foundation that was “inconsistent” with
FLRA.140
Soon after Reporters Committee was decided, the United States
Department of Justice Office of Information and Privacy issued a re-
port concerning the ramifications of that decision on FOIA process-
ing.141 The Justice Department advised agency FOIA offices that the
Court’s “new ‘core purpose’ public interest standard . . . should gov-
ern the process of balancing interests under Exemptions 6 and
7(C).”142 The Supreme Court’s terse decision in ONDA reaffirmed
the strong signal it sent to lower courts and government agencies in
its earlier decisions, confirming the Court’s intention to continue to
strictly enforce the central purpose doctrine. Thus, at least when the
privacy exemptions are involved, agencies may continue to rely on
the central purpose doctrine and deny requests that fail the balancing
test with little fear of reversal by the judiciary.143
III. THE ELECTRONIC FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1996
In an attempt to address the serious problem of agency backlogs
in processing FOIA requests, Congress passed the Electronic Free-
dom of Information Act Amendments of 1996.144 While these
amendments have been praised as finally bringing FOIA into the
electronic age,145 they do not solve all the problems facing FOIA.146
138. Id. at 1171.
139. ONDA, 117 S. Ct. at 795.
140. See id.
141. See Privacy Protection Under the Supreme Court’s Reporters Committee Decision,
FOIA UPDATE (Office of Info. and Privacy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), Spring 1989, at 3.
142. Id. at 6.
143. But see infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text (discussing the possible elimination
of the central purpose doctrine by the 1996 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amend-
ments).
144. E-FOIA, supra note 24, 110 Stat. 3048. The House noted, in passing these amend-
ments, that the “lack of sufficient agency resources has constrained the effectiveness of the
FOIA.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 6 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3449.
145. See Statement on Signing the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of
1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1949, 1949 (October 2, 1996) [hereinafter E-FOIA Sign-
ing Statement]. Earlier attempts to expand FOIA to electronic records had failed. See, e.g.,
Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1993, S. 1782, 103d Cong.; Freedom of Information
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Some commentators have argued that E-FOIA will actually increase
both the cost of FOIA147 and agency time delays in responding to re-
quests.148 Even more troublesome is the potential that this overhaul of
FOIA will require relitigation of FOIA issues, as agencies try to side-
step settled FOIA doctrine by citing E-FOIA’s alterations to the
statutory language.149
A. E-FOIA’s Major provisions
1. Electronic Reading Rooms: Placing Government Information
On-Line. Section 4 of E-FOIA requires agencies to make certain
records created on or after November 1, 1996, available for public
inspection “by computer telecommunications or . . . by other
electronic means” within one year of their creation.150 This provision,
Improvement Act and the Electronic Freedom of Information Improvement Act, S. 1940, 102d
Cong. (1991); H.R. 2773, 101st Cong. (1989).
146. See Kirtley, FOIA, supra note 23, at 9 (pointing out that E-FOIA does not tackle the
problems of excessive access fees or the tension between privacy and disclosure in FOIA doc-
trine).
147. See Cate et al., supra note 118, at 73 (“[FOIA’s] costs threaten to increase exponen-
tially when the FOIA is applied to the increasing number of computerized agency records.”).
148. See Robert Gellman, I Predict That E-FOIA Will Slow Down Agency Responses,
GOV’T COMPUTER NEWS, Nov. 18, 1996, at 27 [hereinafter Gellman, E-FOIA Will Slow Down
Agency Responses] (arguing that new procedural requirements will cause agency FOIA opera-
tions to slow down “as agencies spend more time on process and less on actual disclosure”).
149. See Mike Feinsilber, Freedom of Information Act Updated, COM. APPEAL, Sept. 22,
1996, at 13A (recounting the concern of David Burnham, co-director of the Transactional Rec-
ords Access Clearing House, that changing FOIA “will give reluctant federal agencies grounds
for ignoring [past] decisions”). Burnham worries that FOIA requesters “may have to refight
battles that have already been won.” Id.
150. E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 4, 110 Stat. at 3049 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (Supp.
II 1996)). If an agency does not have the means necessary to publish the materials on the Web,
the agency would be able to satisfy the requirements of this section by making the records
available on CD-ROM or diskette. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 20 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3463. The records that are to be made available for public inspection by
electronic means are:
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders,
made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the
agency and are not published in the Federal Register;
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the
public;
(D) copies of all records, regardless of form or format, which have been released to
any person . . . and which, because of the nature of their subject matter, the agency
determines have become or are likely to become the subject of subsequent requests
for substantially the same records; and
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designed to promote access to government information via the
Internet,151 creates what Attorney General Janet Reno termed
“electronic reading rooms.”152 Of the documents subject to this
provision, the type that will be of most interest to the general public
and that has the greatest potential for reducing the total number of
FOIA requests are copies of previously released records that are
likely to be the subject of subsequent requests.153 In the FBI’s
electronic reading room,154 for example, documents posted in
compliance with this provision include information of popular
interest on such topics as Elvis Presley,155 Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg,156 and various UFO sightings.157
Some FOIA observers have argued that this provision will lead
to extensive litigation since “a requester who disagrees with an
agency’s assessment of the likelihood of future requests may be able
to sue to challenge that assessment.”158 The merits of this argument
are questionable for two reasons. First, it is difficult to imagine how
an individual would have standing to challenge the agency’s assess-
ment, since the individual would not have suffered any concrete harm
as a result of an agency decision not to make a particular document
or set of documents available in electronic reading rooms.159 Second,
(E) a general index of the records referred to under subparagraph (D).
E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 4, 110 Stat. at 3049 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)).
One commentator has erroneously stated that § 552(a)(2) requires all records created af-
ter November 1, 1996, to be made available electronically within one year of their creation. See
David MacDonald, Note, The Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments: A Minor
Upgrade to Public Access Law, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 357, 375 (1997). Such a
requirement would be nearly impossible for agencies to fulfill and would be an incredible waste
of agency resources.
151. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 11, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3454.
152. Attorney General Reiterates FOIA Policy, FOIA UPDATE (Office of Info. and Privacy,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice), Spring 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Reno Memo].
153. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 4, 110 Stat. at 3049 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D)
(Supp. II 1996)).
154. FBI FOIA Electronic Reading Room (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www.fbi.gov/foipa/
document.htm>.
155. See Index of /foipa/elvis (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www.fbi.gov/foipa/elvis/>.
156. See Index of /foipa/rosen (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www.fbi.gov/foipa/rosen/>.
157. See Index of /foipa/ufo (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www.fbi.gov/foipa/ufo/>.
158. Electronic Freedom of Information Improvement: Hearing on S. 1090 Before the Sub-
comm. on Gov’t Management, Info. and Tech. of the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Over-
sight, 104th Cong. 74 (1996) (testimony of Robert Gellman) [hereinafter Gellman Testimony];
see also MacDonald, supra note 150, at 382 (arguing that the provision will likely result in an
“explosion of litigation”).
159. An agency’s assessment would not be aimed at anyone in particular, and an individual
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E-FOIA leaves to agency discretion the determination of which rec-
ords are likely to become the subject of repeated requests.160 Since
courts have historically shown great deference to the exercise of
agency discretion in the context of FOIA,161 any challenge to an
agency determination likely will be unsuccessful.
Critics also argue that agencies may divert resources to publish-
ing older, previously released documents at the expense of processing
current requests.162 This argument cynically assumes that agencies will
act in bad faith and will actively attempt to delay FOIA processing.
The merits of this view are questionable given the Clinton admini-
stration’s efforts to encourage open government. In 1993, after the
dismal FOIA performance record of the Reagan and Bush admini-
strations,163 President Clinton signaled a desire to reverse the trend.
In a memorandum to department and agency heads, he made it clear
that “[t]he existence of unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles has no place
in [FOIA’s] implementation.”164 In 1997, following the passage of E-
FOIA, Attorney General Janet Reno wrote another memorandum to
department and agency heads, reaffirming the administration’s posi-
tion on FOIA.165 While the Clinton administration has not earned a
perfect FOIA report card,166 agencies appear to be moving away from
actively impeding FOIA administration.167
would still have access to the document through traditional FOIA channels. Cf. Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1992) (“[T]he alleged violation of a right to have the
Government act in accordance with law [is] not judicially cognizable because ‘assertion of a
right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting
differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III . . . .’” (quoting Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984))).
160. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 4, 110 Stat. at 3049 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D)
(Supp. II 1996)).
161. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing agency discretion in the context
of granting fee waivers).
162. See MacDonald, supra note 150, at 383 n.164 (arguing that “[a]gencies may find less
political risk in processing antiquated documents than current and controversial ones”); Gell-
man Testimony, supra note 158, at 74.
163. See Jane Kirtley, Public Access to Records Always Under Attack, EDITOR & PUB-
LISHER MAG., July 7, 1997, at 48 (noting that the Clinton administration “inherited a legacy of
entrenched bureaucratic resistance to openness promulgated during the Reagan and Bush ad-
ministrations”).
164. Memorandum from President Clinton on FOIA to Heads of Departments and Agen-
cies (Oct. 4, 1993), reprinted in FOIA UPDATE (Office of Info. and Privacy, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice), Summer/Fall 1993, at 3 [hereinafter 1993 Clinton Memo].
165. See Reno Memo, supra note 152, at 1 (“As your department or agency implements the
Electronic FOIA amendments, I urge you to be sure to continue our strong commitment to the
openness-in-government principles that President Clinton and I [have] established . . . .”).
166. See Open Records Ensure Freedoms, WIS. ST. J., July 4, 1997, at 13A (noting that the
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The creation of these electronic reading rooms has a tremendous
potential for making important information readily available to the
general public.168 The electronic reading rooms will also save time and
money for agencies, as they will be able to unburden themselves of
requests by multiple persons for similar information.169 This provision
creates a relatively inexpensive and efficient method of “open[ing]
agency action to the light of public scrutiny.”170
2. Specifying the Format of Requested Information. Prior to the
passage of E-FOIA, an agency was under no obligation to
accommodate a requester’s preference for a particular format for
requested information. In Dismukes v. Department of the Interior,171
the requester sought to obtain from the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) a copy of a computer tape which listed the names and
addresses of the participants in six 1982 BLM Simultaneous Oil and
Gas Leasing lotteries.172 The Agency was willing to make the
information available on microfiche, but the requester argued that
Clinton administration’s record is “mixed,” but emphasizing that it is “an improvement upon
the policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations”).
167. See Federal Information Policy Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t
Management, Info., and Tech. of the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight, 104th
Cong. 51 (1996) (statement of J. Kevin O’Brien, Chief, Freedom of Info. and Privacy Acts Sec-
tion, FBI) [hereinafter O’Brien Testimony] (asserting that the FBI would continue its “best
efforts” to reduce its backlog of unprocessed FOIA requests); Letter from John C. Dwyer,
Acting Associate Attorney General, to The Speaker of the United States House of Representa-
tives (July 1, 1997) (expressing the Clinton administration’s “firm commitment” to FOIA and
to “its faithful implementation in [a] strong spirit of government openness”), reprinted in
OFFICE OF INFO. AND PRIVACY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOJ ANNUAL FOIA REPORT TO
CONGRESS 1996, available at DOJ Annual FOIA Report to Congress - 1996 (visited Apr. 1,
1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/annual_report/1996/96-sp.htm>. There is a risk, of course, that
future administrations will revert to a more restrictive FOIA policy. If that scenario becomes a
reality, the courts could intervene and set reasonable limitations on agency discretion. Agen-
cies would still be subject to FOIA’s time limits, and if, as a result of diverting resources to post
previously released material, an agency took too long responding to newer requests, the courts
could compel disclosure and require the agency to shift resources back to processing current
requests.
168. The system is by no means perfect, however. For example, when I examined some FBI
information on UFOs, the documents on the screen were barely legible due to the condition of
the original documents. See FBI FOIA Electronic Reading Room, UFO: Section 1 (visited Apr.
1, 1998) <http://www.fbi.gov/foipa/ufo/ufo1.pdf>.
169. See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 9 (1996) (“Government dissemination of more varieties
and greater amounts of its information holdings via [the information] ‘superhighway’ may re-
duce the volume of FOIA requests . . . .”).
170. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
171. 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984).
172. See id. at 760-61.
WICHMANNFINAL.DOC 11/03/98  10:38 AM
1238 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:1213
the computer tape version would be more convenient for his
purposes.173 The district court held that release on microfiche was
sufficient.174 The court stated that the Agency was only required to
provide “responsive, nonexempt information in a reasonably
accessible form.”175 The district court’s decision seriously undermined
the effectiveness of FOIA in the electronic age. By not releasing
information in the requested format, an agency can substantially
decrease the usefulness of the information to the requester,
sometimes effectively denying access to the information.176 For
information-seekers looking for “trends, abuses and outrages,”
electronic searching of government material can reduce search times
from days or weeks to hours or minutes.177
An illustration of how important format can be is the Environ-
mental Working Group’s (EWG) request to the FDA for pesticide
monitoring results.178 The EWG, a nonprofit organization, wanted
certain data to enable it to “analyze the variance between levels of
toxins that are inherent in imported foods consumed by infants and
children, as compared to adults.”179 The FDA refused to release the
data in electronic form, instead releasing the data in the “unwieldy
physical form of [6,000 pages of] paper documents,” a form that was
“cumbersome, confusing, and unorganized [sic] for the efficient sta-
tistical analysis necessary for quality scientific research.”180 The EWG
was able to complete its project, but only at an unnecessarily high
cost:
173. See id. at 762.
174. See id. at 763.
175. Id.
176. See Ira Chinoy, Amendment Seeks to Open Public Files to Digital Diggers, WASH.
POST, Sept. 18, 1996, at A17 (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy, E-FOIA’s Senate sponsor, as
saying: “In the society we’re in today, you are not going to have the access to what the govern-
ment is doing in any practical fashion if you don’t have access electronically”); cf. Feinsilber,
supra note 149, at A13. Feinsilber discusses the experience of the Miami Herald, which wanted
to match the names of those with permits to carry concealed weapons against a list of school
bus drivers. The Herald was given the requested information under the Florida state FOIA—
but on “yards and yards of paper.” The Herald was forced to abandon the project because it
could not perform a computer match. See id.
177. Chinoy, supra note 176, at A17.
178. See Jeffrey Norgle, Comment, Revising the Freedom of Information Act for the Infor-
mation Age: The Electronic Freedom of Information Act, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 817, 817-19 (1996).
179. Id. at 817-18 (citations omitted).
180. Id. at 818.
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The FDA’s decision left the EWG with no choice other than to bear
the financial burden of paying a commercial scanning firm to input
the pesticide data. Then, the EWG had to go through the labor in-
tensive chore of converting the data into suitable electronic for-
mat—the very format that the FDA maintained all along.181
E-FOIA will prevent such inefficiencies from occurring in the fu-
ture by requiring agencies to provide a requested record “in any form
or format requested by the person if the record is readily reproduci-
ble by the agency in that form or format.”182 This provision was in-
tended to override the holding in Dismukes,183 and the new language
should increase the usefulness and efficiency of FOIA.
3. First In/First Out and Multi-Track Processing. Courts have
permitted agencies to process FOIA requests on a first in/first out
(FIFO) basis.184 FIFO processing standing alone is problematic,
however, because simple requests that could be processed rapidly are
delayed while earlier, more complex requests are handled.185 In the
interest of efficiency and speed, some agencies, such as the FBI, have
set up two-track systems—dividing requests into simple and complex
requests—which are processed on separate FIFO bases.186 E-FOIA
gives agencies statutory authority to establish such multi-track
systems, but it does not require the establishment of such systems.187
Since some agencies had already established multi-track systems, this
development is not very momentous; the multi-tracking option in the
statute will, at most, give agencies that do not currently use multi-
tracking a reason to consider whether they might benefit from such a
system. While the lack of explicit guidelines has drawn some
criticism,188 it would be unwise to require all agencies to set up a
uniform multi-tracking system since lengthy delays do not plague
every agency.189 By permitting individual agencies to design their own
systems, E-FOIA allows each agency to tailor a processing system to
its distinct needs. For example, an agency with a severe backlog
might want to create three tracks and assign its most experienced
personnel to the track containing the most complex requests. Other
agencies with only minor backlogs might prefer a two-track system,
or even a single-track system. Encouraging agencies to set their own
181. Id. at 818-19.
182. E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 5, 110 Stat. at 3050 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B)
(Supp. II 1996)).
183. See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 14 (1996).
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rules regarding multi-track systems will likely encourage
experimentation. Through this process, agencies will learn which
procedures work best, and will be able to borrow from other
agencies’ experiences with various systems.
4. Expedited Review. Occasionally, a FOIA requester will have
an urgent need for the requested information, and delays in
processing the request can have serious consequences.190 In response,
E-FOIA requires agencies to set up a system of expedited processing
for cases where the requester demonstrates a “compelling need.”191
This requirement can be met in one of two ways. First, a compelling
need is present when “a failure to obtain requested records on an
expedited basis . . . could reasonably be expected to pose an
imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual.”192 This
provision will help minimize the most severe kinds of adverse effects
which delays in FOIA can have on requesters. Furthermore, since it
is doubtful that many people will be able to meet the provision’s high
standard,193 it is unlikely that the provision will result in serious delays
to the processing of non-expedited requests. Since an agency’s denial
of a request for expedited review is subject to judicial review,194
requesters will likely challenge denials of expedited review in the
courts. But courts should have little trouble absorbing any increased
litigation. After all, prior to E-FOIA, courts were already making
184. See supra notes 85 & 97 and accompanying text.
185. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 23 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3466.
186. See Gellman, E-FOIA Will Slow Down Agency Responses, supra note 148, at 27.
187. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 7, 110 Stat. at 3050 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(6)(D)(i) (Supp. II 1996)) (“Each agency may promulgate regulations . . . providing for
multi-track processing . . . .” (emphasis added)).
188. See, e.g., Gellman, E-FOIA Will Slow Down Agency Responses, supra note 148, at 27
(arguing that E-FOIA’s multi-track authorization is likely to make “[l]engthy administrative
delays” more commonplace).
189. See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 16 (1996) (noting that 28 of 75 agencies responding to a
Department of Justice survey in February 1994 reported no backlog of requests).
190. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
191. E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 8, 110 Stat. at 3052 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i)(I)
(Supp. II 1996)).
192. Id. (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(I) (Supp. II 1996)).
193. See MacDonald, supra note 150, at 384 (“Only a small number of requesters should be
able to show that their own or other lives [are] hanging in the balance pending a FOIA re-
quest.”).
194. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 8, 110 Stat. at 3052 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(6)(E)(iii) (Supp. II 1996)).
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such determinations, albeit at a later stage, when determining
whether to stay proceedings and grant an agency additional time to
process a request.195
Second, for requesters that are “primarily engaged in dissemi-
nating information,” the compelling need requirement may be satis-
fied by a showing of “urgency to inform the public concerning actual
or alleged Federal Government activity.”196 The media will be the
primary beneficiary of this provision, and it is reasonable to expect
that reporters will attempt to invoke it frequently. FOIA critics have
found fault with the statute precisely because it is no longer used
primarily by the media to inquire into the activities of the govern-
ment.197 While this provision will not prevent non-media requesters
from using FOIA, and thus does not directly respond to these critics’
concerns, it will give certain media requests preferential processing,
thereby making FOIA work more effectively for the media. Acceler-
ating media access to information on government activities is a posi-
tive development for FOIA. Since one of FOIA’s original objectives
was to “open agency action to the light of public scrutiny,”198 it is both
195. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
196. E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 8, 110 Stat. at 3052 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(6)(E)(v)(II) (Supp. II 1996)).
197. See, e.g., Amy E. Rees, Recent Developments Regarding the Freedom of Information
Act: A “Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, Perhaps Both,” 44 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1184 (1995)
(lamenting the fact that “FOIA has rarely if ever been used as a powerful external check on
governmental affairs,” and noting that “the typical FOIA request is made by a wily civil litigant
circumventing traditional discovery rules, a corporate counsel in search of competitor’s finan-
cial information, or a conspiracy theorist demanding operational files of the [CIA] on himself
or other players in covert intelligence maneuvers in Cuba”); Scalia, supra note 1, at 16
(“[FOIA was] promoted as a boon to the press, the public interest group, the little guy; [it has]
been used most frequently by corporate lawyers. . . . [The current situation] is a far cry from
John Q. Public finding out how his government works.”). Perhaps the most scathing and exten-
sive critique of FOIA was delivered by Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman, in
1988:
Today, a typical FOIA scenario is not, as envisioned by the Congress, the journalist
who seeks information about the development of public policy which he will shortly
publish for the edification of the electorate. Rather, it is the corporate lawyer seeking
business secrets of a client’s competitors; the felon attempting to learn who it was
who informed against him; the drug trafficker trying to evade the law; the foreign re-
quester seeking a benefit that our citizens cannot obtain from his country; or the pri-
vate litigant who, constrained by discovery limitations, turns to the FOIA to give him
what a trial court will not.
The Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Tech. and the Law of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 37 (1988) (footnote omitted).
198. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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reasonable and desirable to give preferential treatment to requests
that are intended to publicize governmental activities.
5. Twenty-Day Time Limit. Prior to the passage of E-FOIA, an
agency was required to determine whether it would comply with a
request for information within ten days of its receipt of the request.199
Agency disregard for the time limits prompted strident criticism from
observers such as Senator Patrick Leahy, author of the Senate
version of E-FOIA. When testifying before the House Subcommittee
on Government Management, Information and Technology of the
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Leahy
complained:
The current time limits in the FOIA are a joke. Few agencies actu-
ally respond to FOIA requests within the 10-day limit required in
the law. Such routine failure to comply with the statutory time limits
is bad for morale in the agencies and breeds contempt by citizens
who expect government officials to abide by, not routinely break,
the law.200
In an attempt to remedy the problem, Congress doubled the
statutory time limit from ten days to twenty days.201 The expansion of
the time limit was intended to “help Federal agencies in reducing
their backlog of FOIA requests.”202 Congress’s recognition of the
need for expanded time limits is commendable, and the new provi-
sion likely will enable agencies with only minor backlogs to process
requests within the statutory limits.203 Unfortunately, a twenty-day
limit is barely more realistic than a ten-day limit for agencies such as
the FBI or the CIA, whose enormous backlogs draw the most criti-
cism. While these agencies may be able to process some of their
smaller, simpler FOIA requests within the twenty-day limit by util-
199. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1994).
200. 142 CONG. REC. S10,894 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also
Sinrod, supra note 44, at 342 (noting that “compliance with FOIA’s ten-day rule has become
the exception rather than the norm”); Beall, supra note 23, at 1254 n.14 (“[T]he 10-day time
limits imposed by [the 1974] Congress no longer have any significance.”).
201. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 8, 110 Stat. at 3052 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(6)(A)(i) (Supp. II 1996)).
202. H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 26 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3469.
203. There is a risk, however, that the new time limits will slow down some FOIA process-
ing since agencies that currently respond within ten days will no longer have the pressure to
comply within ten days. See Gellman Testimony, supra note 158, at 75.
WICHMANNFINAL.DOC 11/03/98  10:38 AM
1998] REPAVING THE FOIA ROAD TO FREEDOM 1243
izing a multi-track system,204 their backlogs are several months long.205
The FBI receives requests for law enforcement information that may
fall within Exemption 7,206 and the CIA receives requests for informa-
tion that may be covered under the National Security Act and may
thus be exempt from disclosure under Exemption 3.207 The FBI208 and
the CIA can actively invoke these exemptions to ensure effective law
enforcement or to protect national security, thus necessitating close
and extensive review of requested documents.209 In view of these cir-
cumstances, it is unlikely that the expanded time limits will result in a
substantial reduction of these agencies’ backlogs. 210
Furthermore, the new twenty-day limit, like its ten-day prede-
cessor, is rife with exceptions. E-FOIA maintains the provision for a
ten-day extension in “unusual circumstances.”211 If it is unlikely that
the agency will complete processing of the request within that time,
the agency must only notify the requester and give that person the
opportunity to limit the scope of the request so that it may be proc-
essed within the time limit.212 If the agency fails to conform to the
time limits, irrespective of whether the requester chose to limit the
scope of his request, the requester is deemed to have exhausted his
administrative remedies and may bring suit in federal district court.213
The district court has the power to allow the agency additional time
to process the request, however, if the agency can show that
“exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is exercising due
204. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
205. See Congress Brings Information Act into Electronic Age, supra note 114.
206. See Sarah Henderson Hutt, In Praise of Public Access: Why the Government Should
Disclose the Identities of Alleged Crime Victims, 41 DUKE L.J. 368, 383 n.88 (1991).
207. See Michael H. Hughes, CIA v. Sims: Supreme Court Deference to Agency Interpreta-
tion of FOIA Exemption 3, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 279, 281 (1985).
208. See Hutt, supra note 206, at 383 n.88.
209. See Hughes, supra note 207, at 281.
210. See Gellman Testimony, supra note 158, at 75 (noting that no matter whether the time
limits are ten or twenty days, agencies with very large backlogs “will never be in compliance”
because “they will not have any more resources”).
211. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 7(b), 110 Stat. at 3050-51 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(6)(B) (Supp. II 1996)). One supporter of a twenty-day time limit argues that the ex-
panded limit should replace the “unusual circumstances” provision, contending that the added
administrative burden of sending out notices of extensions to requesters is unnecessary. See
Sinrod, supra note 44, at 357.
212. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 7(b), 110 Stat. at 3050-51 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§
552(a)(6)(B)(i)-(ii) (Supp. II 1996)).
213. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i) (Supp. II 1996).
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diligence in responding to the request.”214 Prior to the passage of E-
FOIA, no statutory definition of “exceptional circumstances” existed,
and the term was thus left to unbridled judicial construction. In an at-
tempt to constrain what was seen as liberal judicial allowance of sig-
nificant time extensions for agencies faced with request backlogs,215
and to encourage agencies to reduce those backlogs, Congress ex-
plicitly stated in E-FOIA that “the term ‘exceptional circumstances’
does not include a delay that results from a predictable agency
workload of requests under this section, unless the agency demon-
strates reasonable progress in reducing its backlog of pending re-
quests.”216
The new statutory language was intended to limit a judge’s abil-
ity to give an agency additional time to respond to a request absent
truly extraordinary circumstances, and thereby to coerce agencies
into reducing their backlogs of requests.217 The new statutory lan-
guage is loose enough, however, to enable judges to continue to grant
time extensions to beleaguered agencies.218 While this reality is con-
trary to congressional intent, it is both unavoidable and desirable in
view of the currently inadequate levels of agency funding for FOIA
request processing. It would be problematic if a judge were forced by
statute to compel disclosure of requested documents without giving
the agency adequate time to review the documents to ensure that
they do not contain exempted material.219 The risks involved are par-
ticularly severe in regard to material that may contain information
that must be kept secret for national security reasons,220 or informa-
tion whose disclosure would result in an invasion of privacy.221
214. Id.
215. See supra Part II.A.
216. E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 7, 110 Stat. at 3051 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(ii)
(Supp. II 1996)).
217. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 24 (1996) (explaining that the language does not cover
“routine backlogs” because permitting such backlogs to “give agencies an automatic excuse to
ignore the time limits . . . provides a disincentive for agencies to clear up those backlogs”), re-
printed in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3467.
218. See infra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
220. Information that is classified by executive order in the interest of national defense or
foreign policy is exempted from disclosure by 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
221. Such information is exempted from disclosure by 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).
President Ford, when he initially vetoed the 1974 FOIA amendments, voiced such a concern:
I believe that confidentiality would not be maintained if many millions of pages of
FBI and other investigatory law enforcement files would be subject to compulsory
disclosure . . . . Our law enforcement agencies do not have, and could not obtain, the
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An application of the new statutory language to the facts of Ed-
mond v. United States Attorney222 illustrates the ease with which
judges could continue to grant time extensions to underfunded agen-
cies. First, while the statute explicitly states that “the term
‘exceptional circumstances’ does not include a delay that results from
a predictable agency workload of requests,”223 Congress did not de-
fine “predictable agency workload.” The district court in Edmond
noted that the USAO had received “a volume of requests for infor-
mation vastly in excess of that anticipated by Congress.”224 The judge
could easily determine that such an unanticipated volume was not
“predictable” under E-FOIA’s language. Second, delays from a pre-
dictable agency workload can constitute exceptional circumstances if
the agency “demonstrates reasonable progress in reducing its backlog
of pending requests.”225 The statute leaves to the courts the job of de-
termining what constitutes “reasonable progress.” Courts could lib-
erally construe this language to give agencies a fair opportunity to
process requests. The Edmond court noted that the USAO had in-
creased its FOIA staff from one to four people.226 The court could
consider this action to be “reasonable progress” toward reducing the
agency’s FOIA backlog under the new language. Third, if a FOIA
requester had earlier refused to narrow the scope of his request or to
arrange for an alternative timetable,227 the judge must consider this
refusal as a factor in determining whether “exceptional circum-
stances” exist.228 Therefore, unless a requester was willing to narrow
the scope of his request before the suit was filed, E-FOIA gives
judges an additional means of granting liberal time extensions to
agencies faced with understaffing and too many FOIA requests.
large number of trained and knowledgeable personnel that would be needed to make
such a line-by-line examination of information requests that sometimes involve hun-
dreds of thousands of documents, within the time constraints added to current law by
this bill.
Veto of Freedom of Information Act Amendments, 1974 PUB. PAPERS 374, 375 (Oct. 17, 1974).
222. 959 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997), discussed in detail supra at pages 1228-29.
223. E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 7, 110 Stat. at 3051 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(ii)
(Supp. II 1996)).
224. Edmond, 959 F. Supp. at 2.
225. E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 7, 110 Stat. at 3051 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(ii)
(Supp. II 1996)).
226. See Edmond, 959 F. Supp. at 3 n.2.
227. See supra text accompanying note 212 (discussing opportunity to narrow scope of re-
quests).
228. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 7, 110 Stat. at 3051 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(6)(C)(ii) (Supp. II 1996)).
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While it is unfortunate that people will have to be satisfied with less
information if they want to receive it in a timely manner, such a result
is unavoidable given Congress’s refusal to allocate sufficient re-
sources to agencies for FOIA processing.
B. E-FOIA’s Likely Effect
Congress passed E-FOIA to accomplish two goals. The first goal,
which it largely achieved, was to “encourage electronic access to
Government information.”229 The requirement that agencies release
as much information as possible in the format requested, including on
CD-ROM or diskette, was a long-overdue step.230 The provisions re-
lating to on-line publication of government information promise to
make information maintained and collected by the government more
accessible to a larger segment of the American public.231 The second
goal, to encourage and assist reduction of agency backlogs of FOIA
requests, will likely prove more elusive. Although increased funding
for FOIA processing is the action most likely to reduce backlogs sig-
nificantly,232 such an increase was noticeably absent from the re-
forms.233
The changes the amendments did accomplish will likely have a
mixed effect on the backlogs. As agencies publish more information
on the Internet, people will need to turn to FOIA less frequently to
obtain desired information and multiple requests for the same infor-
mation will certainly be reduced.234 But FOIA will still continue to be
widely used; agency FOIA processing teams will continue to be un-
229. S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 5 (1996); see also E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 2(a)(6), 110 Stat. at
3048 (“Government agencies should use new technology to enhance public access to agency
records and information.”).
230. See Electronic Freedom of Information Improvement: Hearing on S. 1090 Before the
Subcomm. on Gov’t Management, Info., and Tech. of the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform and
Oversight, 104th Cong. 98 (1996) (testimony of James P. Lucier, Jr.) (categorizing E-FOIA’s
technological provisions as not “particularly astonishing” and “little more fundamental than
requiring agencies to publish their telephone numbers now that telephones have been in-
vented”).
231. See E-FOIA Signing Statement, supra note 145, at 1949.
232. See O’Brien Testimony, supra note 167, at 51 (“It is clear, however, that only more
analysts, trained to process requests, can significantly diminish the backlogs . . . .”).
233. See MacDonald, supra note 150, at 384 (calling the failure to fund “[t]he first and pri-
mary failure” of E-FOIA). For a discussion of the Senate proposal to fund the amendments
that was not passed, as well as other proposed ways to fund FOIA, see infra Part IV.B.
234. See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 9 (1996) (“Government dissemination of more varieties
and greater amounts of its information holdings via a ‘superhighway’ may reduce the volume of
FOIA requests.”).
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derfunded and understaffed; and the time required to process re-
quests will continue to result in backlogs. The provisions authorizing
multi-tracking will probably speed up the processing of simpler re-
quests, but the fact that the FBI had a system of multi-tracking in
place prior to E-FOIA,235 yet had one of the worst backlogs,236 demon-
strates that multi-tracking is not a panacea. It remains to be seen how
expedited review will work in practice, because the amendments
leave the details to agency regulations.237 While the expedited proc-
essing provisions may lead to more litigation238 and may increase
overall delay and costs,239 their benefits outweigh these drawbacks.
Expedited review will secure rapid access to information for those
requesters with the most urgent need for information, and it will ac-
celerate the media’s efforts to provide the public with important in-
formation about governmental activities. Finally, the twenty-day time
limit may help agencies with minor backlogs, but it will have only a
minor effect on agencies with the largest backlogs, and congressional
attempts to limit the judiciary’s ability to grant these agencies time
extensions likely will be ineffective. Thus, since it is doubtful that E-
FOIA will substantially improve the speed at which FOIA requests
are processed, more invasive surgery is required.
IV. ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS TO STREAMLINE FOIA
Congressional attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to reduce the cost
and delays associated with FOIA were inadequate. Likewise, it ap-
pears that E-FOIA will not substantially accelerate agency processing
of FOIA requests. These failures result from Congress’s apparent
235. See Gellman, E-FOIA Will Slow Down Agency Responses, supra note 148, at 27.
236. See 142 CONG. REC. S10,894 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(noting that FOIA requests to the FBI can take up to four years to be processed).
237. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 8, 110 Stat. at 3051 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(6)(E)(i) (Supp. II 1996)). For example, it is unknown how expedited review will func-
tion in combination with multi-track processing. One commentator suggests that an agency
might put all other requests on hold so it can devote all of its FOIA resources to processing the
expedited cases. See Gellman, E-FOIA Will Slow Down Agency Responses, supra note 148, at
27. One of the only firm requirements that the amendments place on agency regulations is that
they ensure “expeditious consideration of administrative appeals of [the] determinations of
whether to provide expedited processing.” E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 8, 110 Stat. at 3052
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(ii)(II) (Supp. II 1996)).
238. Cf. Gellman Testimony, supra note 158, at 74 (noting that “virtually every word in the
FOIA has been the subject of intense litigation”).
239. See MacDonald, supra note 150, at 383 (arguing that the expedited review provisions
“will add significant costs to administrative overhead” and will “further drain agency resources
and slow down FOIA compliance overall”).
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preference for administrative solutions, such as multi-track process-
ing and expanded time limits. This focus on administrative improve-
ments shifts the debate away from the underlying cause of FOIA’s
problems: a lack of adequate funding and staffing for agencies’
FOIA-processing divisions.
One group of scholars has suggested expanding the central pur-
pose doctrine as a means of making FOIA more efficient and less
costly.240 Their claim is that this proposal would return the statute to
its intended purpose as a tool for citizens to open governmental op-
erations to the light of public scrutiny.241 It would also avoid the need
for additional funding. This Part examines this proposal as well as a
funding provision that was in the original Senate E-FOIA bill242 but
that was not included in the final Act. These proposals are analyzed
both for their potential effects on the cost and delays associated with
FOIA and for their ability to conform to an overarching commitment
to openness in government.
A. Returning FOIA to Its Roots: Expanding the Central Purpose
Doctrine
Anyone may use FOIA to procure non-exempt information for
any reason.243 Some critics have attacked the absence of a purpose re-
quirement because public dollars are not unlimited and other public
causes may be more deserving.244 The absence of such a requirement
invites abuse,245 “bring[ing] into the system requests that are not
240. See, e.g., Cate et al., supra note 118, at 67-69.
241. See id. at 45.
242. S. 1090, 104th Cong. (1996).
243. The statute itself places no limitations on who may request records or for what reason.
As long as the records do not fall within one of the statutory exemptions, an agency, “upon any
request for records which (A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance
with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall
make the records promptly available to any person.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1994) (emphases
added). Courts have reaffirmed this basic principle of FOIA, noting that Congress “clearly in-
tended the FOIA to give any member of the public as much right to disclosure as one with a
special interest in a particular document.” United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm.
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 6 (1996) (“Requesters do not have to show a need or reason for
seeking information.”), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3449.
244. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 17 (criticizing FOIA and its costs because requests that
“may be motivated by no more than idle curiosity” take “money from the Treasury that could
be better spent elsewhere”).
245. See Scott Shane, Panning for Gold in Government Files: Businesses Make Most of
Public Right to Know, BALTIMORE SUN, July 28, 1997, at 1A (noting that some people have
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really important enough to be there, [and] crowding out the genu-
inely desirable ones to the end of the line.”246 One possible solution to
these problems is to expand the central purpose doctrine247 beyond
the realm of the privacy exemptions, empowering agencies to apply
the doctrine directly to all FOIA requests received.248 Advocates of a
universal central purpose standard argue that it would dramatically
reduce the costs and delays currently associated with FOIA.249 Agen-
cies could use the doctrine to decide quickly whether to deny a re-
quest as being outside the scope of FOIA, or whether to process the
request more fully. Supporters argue that the doctrine would help
eliminate FOIA abuses and would help return FOIA to its original
purpose of enabling citizens to learn about the activities of govern-
ment.250 Such a proposal is theoretically feasible, given the apparent
willingness within some federal courts to expand the central purpose
doctrine beyond the privacy exemptions.251 There are, however, sev-
eral problems with such a proposal.
At a practical level, the current Congress appears to be moving
away from limiting the scope of FOIA and has, in fact, reaffirmed its
commitment to universal access to FOIA for any purpose. The find-
ings accompanying E-FOIA explicitly state that “the purpose of
[FOIA] is to . . . establish and enable enforcement of the right of any
person to obtain access to the records of [agencies of the Federal
become “FOIA hobbyists”). One such FOIA hobbyist, Michael J. Ravnitsky of St. Paul, Min-
nesota, “has flooded a dozen agencies with 2,200 FOIA requests.” Id. Ravnitsky, who recently
got a bill from the FBI for $18,000 in costs, stated: “‘I think FOIA is great fun. It’s a national
treasure.’” Id. He says that he is not planning on paying the bill. See id.
246. Scalia, supra note 1, at 17.
247. See discussion supra Part II.B. (discussing the central purpose doctrine, which has been
used to uphold the denial, based on the privacy exemptions, of FOIA requests that do not serve
FOIA’s “central purpose,” which is to ensure access to information concerning the activities of
government, not those of private citizens).
248. See Cate et al., supra note 118, at 67 (“The test for whether a request seeks ‘official
information’ should be the touchstone for disclosure under FOIA. . . . [O]nly information that
will serve the purpose of ensuring that ‘the Government’s activities be opened to the sharp eye
of public scrutiny’ should ever be subject to disclosure under the FOIA.” (quoting Reporters
Comm., 489 U.S. at 774)). But see Beall, supra note 23, at 1279-80, 1300 (criticizing the central
purpose doctrine as “contrary to the original spirit of FOIA,” and expressing dismay over the
doctrine’s “exaltation of privacy doctrines” that erode “one of the central bulwarks to a free
democracy,” access to information).
249. See Cate et al., supra note 118, at 69, 72.
250. See id. at 67-68.
251. See Beall, supra note 23, at 1273-80 (reviewing cases in which lower courts incorpo-
rated the central purpose doctrine’s language in non-privacy exemption cases).
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Government], subject to statutory exemptions, for any public or pri-
vate purpose.”252 Senator Leahy explained the finding as follows:
This finding is intended to address concerns that the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee and
the U.S. Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority
analyzed the purpose of the FOIA too narrowly. . . . Efforts by the
courts to articulate a ‘core purpose’ for which information should be
released imposes a limitation on the FOIA which Congress did not
intend and which cannot be found in its language, and distorts the
broader import of the Act in effectuating Government openness.253
Senator Leahy’s comments illustrate his dissatisfaction with the
central purpose doctrine. Nonetheless, the central purpose doctrine
will likely survive within its present boundaries because nothing in
the statute expressly prohibits courts from employing the doctrine as
part of the privacy exemptions’ balancing tests.254 The legislative
findings, however, may prevent courts from expanding the central
purpose doctrine to other areas of FOIA, and they send a strong sig-
nal that Congress is not likely to limit the scope of FOIA in the near
future.
A second practical problem with the proposed expansion of the
central purpose doctrine is that agencies might exercise a broader
power too expansively. Agency determinations would have to be re-
viewable by the courts, and this increased litigation would dramati-
cally increase the costs and delays associated with FOIA—the very
problems such a solution was intended to fix.255
252. E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 2(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 3048 (emphases added).
253. S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 24 (1996) (additional views of Senator Leahy) (citations omit-
ted).
254. In fact, it is difficult to avoid the use of a balancing test. For example, under Exemp-
tion 7(C), material may be withheld if disclosure would result in an “unwarranted invasion” of
privacy. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1994). In order to determine whether an invasion of pri-
vacy would be unwarranted, a court is forced to weigh the relative merits of the interest in dis-
closure and the privacy interest involved. See Dickinson, supra note 130, at 209-10 (“[B]y cast-
ing the personal privacy exemptions as balancing tests, Congress reintroduced into disclosure
disputes the issue of merit.”). Senator Leahy appears to have recognized this necessity. His at-
tachment to the Senate report accompanying E-FOIA states that the requester’s intended use
can properly be considered when balancing the public interest in disclosure against the privacy
interest. See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 27 (additional views of Senator Leahy). Most likely, any
congressional attempt to fully overturn Reporters Committee and its progeny and to eliminate
the central purpose doctrine would need to be more explicit.
255. One way to avoid such a problem would be to require FOIA requesters to state how
the information they are requesting is likely to shed light on the activities and operations of the
government. This type of initial purpose statement would assist agencies in making the initial
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A final practical problem is that requesters often do not know in
advance what their requests will reveal. Thus, while it is true that
FOIA is being used by corporate lawyers to conduct industrial espio-
nage,256 the information they obtain occasionally reveals hidden gov-
ernmental abuses;257 corporate requesters cannot anticipate these con-
tents until after the agencies have disclosed the material and the
requesters have had the opportunity to examine it. Thus, while such
requesters may have selfish motives for making their requests, the
public may benefit from the information as well. While such occa-
sional indirect benefits may be difficult to justify given that govern-
ment resources are limited,258 the proper response to this problem is
not to limit the scope of FOIA; the proper response was made in
1986 when FOIA’s fee provisions were amended to shift the cost of
processing primarily commercial requests to the requester.259 It is un-
wise to place limits on who can use FOIA and for what purposes they
can use it, because limiting a basic freedom can end up having the
unintended consequence of hurting those who need it most.260 Any
initial limitation of a freedom facilitates subsequent limitations of
that freedom; it is preferable not to start down that road.
Expansion of the central purpose doctrine would perform the
undesired service of further tipping the scales toward government se-
determination. But see Cate et al., supra note 118, at 68 n.229 (arguing that a congressional at-
tempt to limit the use of FOIA for purely private purposes by requiring that requesters demon-
strate a “public purpose use” for the requested information would be ineffective and ultimately
“unworkable”).
256. See Wald, supra note 25, at 666.
257. See id. at 670 (noting the risk of “increas[ing] the cozy, closed door government-
business dealings which were the very sort of practices the Act was designed to root out”)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Public interest groups argue that moving too quickly to cut
off public disclosure of business data would be unwise, claiming that such a move would shield
such embarrassing information as “drug company tests on humans [that are performed] before
completing animal tests, toxic chemicals dumped into streams and rivers, inspection reports of
the Department of Agriculture concerning unwholesome meat, [and] misleading reports by a
utility to its ratepayers about the costs of a new nuclear plant.” Id. at 669-70 (footnotes omit-
ted).
258. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 17-18 (“[FOIA’s] defects . . . might not be defects in the
best of all possible worlds. They are foolish extravagances only because we do not have an un-
limited amount of federal money to spend, [or] an unlimited number of agency employees to
assign . . . .”).
259. See 1986 Reform Act, supra note 37, § 1803, 100 Stat. at 3207-48 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (1994)). For a discussion of the 1986 amendments, see supra Part I.C.
260. Cf. The Electronic Freedom of Information Improvement Act: Hearings on S. 1940 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Tech. and the Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 96
(1992) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“[A]ll of us would look at some requests as frivolous, but
that is part of the price of democracy.”).
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crecy and away from disclosure.261 The central purpose doctrine was
ostensibly intended to return FOIA to its original purposes. In de-
ciding the central purpose doctrine cases, however, the Supreme
Court ignored one of FOIA’s important original purposes. Section 3
of the Administrative Procedure Act had required agencies to dis-
close information only “to persons properly and directly con-
cerned.”262 The passage of FOIA in 1966 was specifically intended to
eliminate “the test of who shall have the right to different informa-
tion.”263 That change was essential to the new scheme that FOIA es-
tablished.264 FOIA represents the basic idea that information in the
government’s possession should be made available to anyone for any
purpose, unless the information is explicitly exempted.265 It is too
simplistic to suggest that FOIA has one single, central purpose that
should override this equally important ideal. Limiting the scope of
FOIA also ignores the collateral benefits of having a broad public
disclosure law, such as “ensur[ing] for the individual citizen a sense of
empowerment and control over a government that can at times ap-
pear monolithic and imperious.”266 It ignores the idea that if
“information is power, then to deny public ownership of government
information is to deny public control over the government.”267 Limit-
ing the amount of information available through FOIA does limit, in
a sense, the amount of power we have over our government. Since
government resources are not infinite, however, it is proper, in some
cases, to place a price on access to certain types of information.
FOIA’s current fee provisions appropriately balance the philosophy
of open government with fiscal realities, however, and it would be
unwise to expand the central purpose doctrine.268
261. See Beall, supra note 23, at 1262 (arguing that the use of the central purpose doctrine
as a gatekeeper “would work a dramatic volte face from the principles of FOIA, improperly
shifting the Act from one that favors disclosure to one that favors secrecy”).
262. Pub. L. No. 79-404, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946).
263. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 40 (1965).
264. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-832, at 7 (1986) (“The inclusion of any type of purpose test
would have made the FOIA as useless as the disclosure statute it replaced.”).
265. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3. This 1965 Senate Report states that the primary purposes
of the law were “to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information
is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language and to provide a court procedure by
which citizens and the press may obtain information wrongfully withheld.” Id.
266. Beall, supra note 23, at 1299.
267. Id.
268. See discussion supra Part I.C (arguing that the 1986 Amendments strike the proper
balance between keeping government activities open to the light of public scrutiny and fiscal
realities).
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B. Fee provisions: Let the Agencies Keep the Money
In passing E-FOIA, Congress recognized that inadequate agency
resources are one of the primary causes of delay in FOIA administra-
tion.269 This is not a novel insight; previous legislators, as well as
scholars and agency heads, have all highlighted the need for more
FOIA funding to ensure the effective operation of the statute.270 Con-
gress attempted to recoup some of the costs of FOIA by amending
the statute’s fee structure in 1986.271 In 1992, agencies spent about
$108 million processing FOIA requests, and charged $8 million in
fees.272 Under the current scheme, however, agencies do not keep
those fees; the money is deposited in the Treasury.273 This fee collec-
tion structure does nothing to help agencies process FOIA requests
more rapidly.
In 1996, Senator Leahy introduced a bill that would have permit-
ted agencies to collect a portion of FOIA fees directly if, looking at
all of their requests, they were in “substantial compliance” with
FOIA’s time limits.274 The purpose of the Senate bill was to give
agencies an incentive to comply with the statutory time limits.275
269. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 13 (1996) (“A principal constraint to the full effective-
ness of the FOIA has been the lack of adequate agency resources.”), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3456; S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 16 (1996) (“The reasons for [the backlogs]
may vary, but principally it appears to be a problem of too few resources in the face of too
heavy a workload.”).
270. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 99-832, at 11 (1986) (citing inadequate resources as a reason
for delay in FOIA processing); Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno on FOIA to
Heads and Departments of Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993) (noting that the principal reason for back-
logs appears to be “too few resources in the face of too heavy a workload”), reprinted in FOIA
UPDATE (Office of Info. and Privacy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), Summer/Fall 1993, at 5; Sinrod,
supra note 44, at 334 (“Congress’ failure to fund FOIA adequately led to backlogs and delays
in many agencies . . . .”).
271. See discussion supra Part I.C (noting that the 1986 Amendments significantly increased
agencies’ ability to charge requesters for the costs of processing requests).
272. See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 21.
273. See id.
274. S. 1090, 104th Cong. § 6(a) (1996). The bill’s language provided:
If at an agency’s request, the Comptroller General determines that the agency annu-
ally has either provided responsive documents or denied requests in substantial com-
pliance with the [time limit] requirements of [5 U.S.C. § 552(a)] (6)(A), one-half of
the fees collected under this section shall be credited to the collecting agency and ex-
pended to offset the costs of complying with this section through staff development
and acquisition of additional request processing resources. The remaining fees col-
lected under this section shall be remitted to the Treasury as general funds or mis-
cellaneous receipts.
Id.
275. See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 16.
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These fee-sharing provisions, however, failed to make it into the final
draft of E-FOIA. While Senator Leahy had good intentions, his bill
would not have been the most effective solution. First, it would have
helped the agencies that needed the least assistance, while the agen-
cies with the biggest backlogs would not have received the additional
money needed to reduce their backlogs.276 Second, an agency can be
in “substantial compliance” by either providing responsive docu-
ments or by denying requests.277 Since the stated purpose of the pro-
posed requirement was to provide agencies with a financial incentive
to reduce backlogs, it is possible that agencies would have denied re-
quests in order to attain “substantial compliance.” This would have
threatened to shift FOIA’s delicate balance towards initial non-
disclosure, an undesirable result. Finally, the administrative costs to
the GAO would have outweighed the benefits of the procedure.278
Under the provision, the GAO might have been required to conduct
a substantial number of FOIA audits annually.279 Since the GAO’s
budget, like that of many agencies, has recently been cut, some critics
argued that “meeting demands for FOIA audits would diminish the
agency’s ability to carry out other functions.”280
One positive feature of the Leahy proposal is that it required
that agencies use the fees collected to improve their FOIA processing
capabilities.281 That aspect of the Leahy bill could be integrated into a
provision that would allow agencies to keep all the FOIA fees that
they collect, irrespective of their level of compliance with the time
limits.282 This solution would eliminate the expense of agency per-
formance audits, and, “rather than simply rewarding agencies that al-
ready are in compliance with FOIA time limits, funds [would] be-
come available to those agencies that experience backlogs to assist
them in overcoming their timing problems.”283
276. See id. at 21 (estimating that, in 1992, agencies that would likely be eligible to retain
fees accounted for only about 10% of the total fees collected, while the four agencies with the
largest backlogs accounted for almost 75% of the total fees collected).
277. See S. 1090, § 6(a).
278. See Gellman Testimony, supra note 158, at 74 (stating that the provision was
“guaranteed to lose money for the government”).
279. See id. at 75.
280. Id.
281. See S. 1090, § 6(a).
282. See Sinrod, supra note 44, at 361.
283. Id. at 361-63 (footnote omitted).
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CONCLUSION
FOIA is not perfect. It is often used by the “wrong” people for
the “wrong” reasons.284 But the basic principle underlying FOIA
should not be abandoned. In the context of a $1.63 trillion federal
budget,285 the $100 to $200 million that FOIA costs each year is min-
uscule. When one considers that FOIA spending is roughly equiva-
lent to federal spending on military bands,286 FOIA suddenly does not
seem so extravagant and wasteful. Spending $200 million or more on
open government is worth the price even after “the era of big gov-
ernment is over.”287 FOIA today is very different than its creators
could have imagined; it is indeed “a far cry from John Q. Public
finding out how his government works.”288 Still, FOIA serves many
valuable purposes,289 and the lofty rhetoric used by early supporters
of open government290 continues to have merit. The specter of a se-
284. See Wald, supra note 25, at 683 (noting that FOIA “sometimes helps the unworthy”).
285. See 1998 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 125 (Borgna Brunner ed., 1998).
286. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look
Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 283 & n.568 (1990) (“$167.5 million [was]
allocated [in Fiscal Year 1989] to military bands.”); Wald, supra note 25, at 665 (arguing that
one must put the cost of FOIA in context and noting that in 1984 “we spent nearly $100 million
annually on military bands”).
287. William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 79, 79 (Jan. 23, 1996); cf. Wald, supra note 25, at 650 (“It is seductively
easy to let go of legislated freedoms on the ground that they are too costly for a beleaguered
Twentieth Century democracy.”) (emphasis omitted).
288. Scalia, supra note 1, at 16.
289. As the House Report accompanying the 1986 FOIA amendments stated:
If it were possible to trace all of the disclosures made under the FOIA, the identifi-
able dollar savings to the taxpayer resulting from those disclosures would almost cer-
tainly exceed the cost of the FOIA. In fact, the savings from a single FOIA disclo-
sure can pay the cost of the entire FOIA for an entire year or even longer. When
[one considers] the non-monetary benefits that result from FOIA disclosures—such
as fairer and more responsive government, better agency policy, health and safety
improvements, and a better informed citizenry—the total benefits of the FOIA far
exceed the costs.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-832, at 10-11 (1986) (internal citations omitted). This House Report recounts
several instances where use of FOIA led to recovery of misspent tax dollars. See id. at 9-10.
Sometimes the amount recovered is relatively small. For example, the Better Government As-
sociation used FOIA “to document that a [government official] illegally used an agency chauf-
feur for non-official transportation.” Id. at 10. The official eventually reimbursed the govern-
ment $6,411. See id. The savings can be substantial, however, such as when the Better
Government Association used FOIA during an investigation of a Navy shipbuilding contractor.
See id. at 9. The investigation uncovered waste and false billing by the contractor, and
“[u]ltimately a settlement was reached with the contractor that resulted in potential savings to
the government of $170 million.” Id.
290. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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cretive federal government, especially one as large and impersonal as
the current one, is reason enough to continue efforts to perfect the
statute. FOIA has many obvious benefits, but there are hidden bene-
fits as well. Simply having a public disclosure statute in the United
States Code “serves as an effective deterrent to government waste,
abuse, and mismanagement.”291 With all of the benefits—tangible and
intangible—FOIA is worth the cost. As Judge Patricia Wald ob-
served: “It takes constant vigilance, commitment, and common sense
to make any law work. I hope we as citizens have all these qualities—
in large measure—to keep the FOIA around for a long time and to
make it work.”292
E-FOIA is illustrative of Congress’s adherence to this goal. In
passing E-FOIA, Congress demonstrated both a willingness to adapt
FOIA to changing times and a desire to continue searching for ways
to make FOIA more effective. Internet publication of government
information will facilitate broad public access to information without
requiring people to bear the added time and expense of making a
FOIA request. E-FOIA’s administrative improvements are a small
step toward increased efficiency in FOIA processing. Nevertheless,
E-FOIA should not be the final effort to perfect FOIA. Future ef-
forts should be directed at funding agency FOIA-processing divi-
sions. Only adequate funding will enable agencies to eliminate back-
logs and delay and allow FOIA to reach its full potential.
291. H.R. REP. NO. 99-832, at 9; accord H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 7 (1996) (noting that
FOIA “may have a certain degree of preventive effect, prompting a higher degree of probity
and conscientiousness in the performance of government operations”), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3450; William Safire, Essay, Free Speech v. Scalia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
1985, at A17 (asserting that FOIA “has done more to inhibit the abuse of Government
power . . . than any legislation in our lifetime”). This deterrent value exists because “[a]gency
managers know that many of their actions are subject to public oversight through documents
obtained by the press and by citizens through the FOIA.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-832, at 9.
292. Wald, supra note 25, at 683 (emphasis added).
